question whether this makes an independent contribution to a plausible moral epistemology. But some moral experiences must be perceptual for moral perception to provide epistemological benefits. This paper aims to undermine the phenomenological motivation for moral perception. I'll argue that cases like Cat and Tiananmen Square aren't best explained as cases of moral perception even if we assume that the contents of perceptual experience aren't in general restricted to 'lower level' properties like shape, motion, and color. Positing distinctively perceptual representations of moral properties would add no explanatory power because a simpler and a more unified account treats their representations in the relevant cases as resulting instead from implicit transitions in thought. In closing I'll briefly discuss the negative implications of my argument for the epistemological role of moral perception. (I'll provide no separate argument that moral perception wouldn't be an epistemologically independent source of knowledge or justification.)
Moral Perception: Focusing the Issue
My argument will concern the following literal notion of moral perception:
(MP) At least some moral properties can figure in the contents of (veridical) perceptual experience.
Perceptual experience has phenomenal character: there is 'something it's like' to have a perceptual experience. As stated, (MP) follows most recent discussions of moral perception in assuming a representational theory of perception: roughly, to have a perceptual experience of an object O as having a property F is to be in a perceptual mental state with phenomenal character that has the representational content that O is F. For simplicity, I'll assume that the relevant kind of content can be understood as a kind of condition under which the experience which has such a content is accurate. 6 To focus discussion, I'll also grant two general claims about perceptual experience which have recently attracted considerable attention. The first is that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable. This is to say that what one perceives can be influenced, in a direct and non-trivial way, by the states of the subject's cognitive system, such as moods, beliefs, and desires. 7 The second claim is that perceptual content can be rich. Perception isn't restricted to representing 'low level' properties like spatial properties, color, shape, pitch, odor, motion, and illumination. Some 'high level' properties or relations can also be represented in perceptual experience. 8 This thesis has been defended for natural kind properties (such as being a pine tree), artifactual kind properties (such as being a table), causal relations, semantic properties, and dispositional properties (such as being edible), among others. Moral properties would also be high level properties. (They would in fact be higher level relative to some other high level properties. The non-moral properties on which moral properties depend will often include other high level properties, only some of which will plausibly be perceptible if any are.)
These two assumptions will be helpful in two respects. First, they help to distinguish doubts about (MP) which are relatively local to the moral case from more general doubts about whether high level properties can be perceived. My doubts will be of the former type. Second, the two assumptions help to distinguish (MP) from neighboring views which accord perception some weaker role in moral experience than (MP) does. 9 When it comes to experiences like Cat, it is one thing to say that an overall mental state that has a perceptual experience as a component can also involve a representation of a moral property as another component, quite another to say that the moral property figures in the content of that perceptual experience. It seems to make sense to speak of 'the overall experience I'm having' when, surrounded by strange noises in a dark forest, I feel frightened, and to say my overall experience would be different if I felt frightened and the forest were silent. 10 The issue is how moral properties are represented in certain overall experiences, not whether they are.
Those who accept (MP) and those who reject it can agree that we often perceive non-normative and non-evaluative properties on which moral and other normative and evaluative properties depend for their instantiation. (I'll bracket a host of complex issues about the nature of this normative dependence.) The hoodlums can be perceived to ignite the cat, irrespective of whether the wrongness that is grounded in their doing so also figures in the contents of our perceptions. Both sides can also agree that perception can assist us in getting a clearer moral gauge of things. It can, for instance, play a role in developing discriminative abilities that make us see behaviors that in no way alter in a different light -as refreshingly simple rather than unrefined, or spontaneous rather than lacking in dignity.
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Both sides can agree that in cases where perception plays some important role in informing us about events or states that bear moral properties, our overall experience can include representation of moral properties. In Cat, for instance, seeing the hoodlums ignite the cat and its striking you as wrong can belong to the same overall experience irrespective of whether wrongness figures in the contents of the perceptual experience that is part of the overall experience. Both sides can further agree that the ability to represent moral properties on the basis of perception is an acquired skill whose possession and exercise require training and various sorts of background beliefs and other cognitive states. And both sides can agree that if representing something as being morally a certain way on the basis of perceptual experience were a result of an inference or some other transition in thought, such transitions needn't be conscious, but can be implicit.
Those who accept (MP) and those who reject it can also agree that moral properties can make a phenomenological difference to overall mental states. If what the hoodlums are doing in Cat didn't strike me as bad, then (all else equal) my overall experience would feel different to me. I might flinch, but I wouldn't have the kind of emotional or affective responses which psychologically normal moral subjects tend to have in scenarios like Cat -responses such as indignation, revulsion, disturbance, a felt disapproval, and affective empathy, as well as other 10 I hope an example is enough. I don't have an account of experience individuation to deal with such fascinating but complicated phenomena as cross-modal integration and influence. 11 Compare Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good (London: Routledge, 1970), 16-17. phenomenal responses like a sense of 'unfittingness '. 12 No doubt many of these responses can also co-occur. In this way moral properties can make a difference to the phenomenology of the experience. In general, a property F can make a phenomenological difference to an overall mental state S irrespective of whether F figures in the contents of a perceptual experience that S has as a part.
At least in psychologically normal subjects, moral experiences (things striking a subject as being morally a certain way) seem closely bound up with emotional or affective responses. We shouldn't assume that emotions themselves are a kind of perception.
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But both the proponents and the opponents of (MP) can allow two weaker claims about how emotional and affective responses relate to the overall mental states in question.
The first claim is that the relevant emotional and affective dispositions (for indignation, revulsion, disturbance, felt disapproval, affective empathy, and the like) are normally shaped in part by the same background moral beliefs which presumably also play a role in representations of moral properties. It is in part because I believe that causing seemingly gratuitous suffering to sentient creatures is normally wrong that I'm disposed both to be disturbed and repulsed I'm happy to grant the general method.
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It begins with a description of two overall mental states each of which has a perceptual experience as a part. The description is supposed to elicit the intuition that the overall mental states differ in their phenomenology but not in the lower level properties represented by the perceptual experiences. The claim that one but not the other of these perceptual experiences involves a particular high level property (being a pine tree, one event causing another, or whatever) as part of its content will be warranted if it best explains why the mental states differ in their phenomenology. For instance, the claim that we can visually experience the property of being a pine tree might be defended as the best explanation of the kind of phenomenological difference that characterizes your experiences of pine trees before and after you develop a disposition to recognize pine trees.
To assess whether MPC can be used to provide a positive argument for (MP), we require a suitable target moral experience and a phenomenologically contrasting experience. A contrast case that involves no moral representation at all would be too dissimilar from the target experience to provide a good test case for (MP). Further, subjects with notably different background moral beliefs will respond differently in many particular cases, but for reasons that are orthogonal to (MP). Recall, however, that both sides can agree that representing something as wrong, or bad, on the basis of non-moral perceptual input tends to be intimately bound up with certain emotional or affective responses at least in psychologically normal subjects. A contrast argument for (MP) might then appeal to phenomenological differences between normal subjects and subjects who share their moral perspective but suffer from affective deficit disorder, such as inability to feel affective empathy for a subject of distress while understanding from behavioral and contextual clues that the subject is in distress. Although the phenomenological difference between Norma and Alex is emotional or affective in some sense, it might nonetheless make a difference to the contents of perceptual experience owing to some suitable mechanism of CP.
But is this the best explanation of the phenomenal contrast between
Norma and Alex? I want to press doubts about this. In what follows I'll clarify the rules of the game as I see them, and then describe some respects in which this explanation is problematic or inferior to at least one rival explanation.
One immediate worry about the above contrast argument for (MP) is that it threatens to show too much. The distinction between an overall mental state and a perceptual experience that it has as a part implies that Norma's overall mental state can meet conditions like (A)-(C) even if her representation of what the hoodlums are doing as bad doesn't figure in the contents of the perceptual experience that is a part of it. Consider a case from physics that mimics Cat:
Proton: When Marie, a trained physicist, sees a puff of smoke in the cloud chamber, she does not need to figure anything out, she can just see that a proton is going by.
Marie's state of its striking her that a proton is going by can meet conditions (A)- I'll now raise three related points against the claim that the phenomenological differences between subjects like Norma and Alex are best explained by (MP).
They'll count as points of criticism given the standard theoretical virtues of simplicity, unity, and explanatory power. (One explanation is better than another, all else equal, if it is simpler, and likewise for the other virtues.) The cumulative upshot of these points is that there is a rival model that seems to be able to explain everything that (MP) explains but is simpler and, at least by one relevant measure, more unified.
Comparing rival explanations against multiple criteria can get tricky. My second point builds on the first. Cases like Proton aren't the only instructive parallel for Cat. Representations of some non-moral evaluative properties seem to parallel moral properties but are more plausibly located outside the perceptual components of overall experiences. Consider:
Fine Wine: Greg, an experienced wine maker, reports that when he samples wine he perceives it as having various non-evaluative qualities which form his basis for classifying it as fine or not. Michael, a wine connoisseur, says that he can taste also fineness in wine. we seem disposed to respond in the same kind of way also when we imagine rather than perceive the thuds and the cries or the hit-and-run, or come to know about the abusive vulgarity or the footbridge incident by description rather than acquaintance.
40
These different types of moral experience can of course differ in degree, such as with respect to how reliably they trigger the associated phenomenology and how vivid they are.
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But they seem all to involve the same kind of representational ability. At the very least we have yet to see good reasons to individuate the relevant abilities to represent moral properties so narrowly that we have one ability for 'vivid' perceptual cases like Cat and another for others.
Explaining these moral experiences seems to require only a general capacity to represent moral properties which is responsive to inputs from perception, imagination, supposition, and belief, and which can be psychologically immediate at least when those inputs are reliably and closely bound up with 39 Note that this model doesn't presuppose that F cannot figure in the contents of one's perceptual experience if one cannot discriminate Fs from not-Fs (e.g. stabbings that are bad from behaviorally identical stabbings that aren't). The relevance of counterfactual conditions to perceptual representation and knowledge is discussed in Cowan, op. cit., note 1. 40 Inputs from imagination can be diverse in further ways. They may involve either mental imagery (the kind of quasi-perceptual process we engage in when, for instance, we close our eyes and imagine seeing something 'in the mind's eye') or propositional imagining. 41 Many philosophers are no doubt desensitized to descriptions of people being pushed off footbridges, owing to the ubiquity of such cases in the trolley problem literature.
certain emotional and affective dispositions. But at least in some cases (MP) would imply that perceptual content is cognitively penetrated twice over: first in the typical way, then by a further addition of moral properties to a framework provided by non-moral high and low level properties.
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The parallel that many discussions of moral perception draw between moral properties and other higher level properties therefore looks exaggerated.
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(MP) requires a more complex picture than such cases of high 42 Robert Cowan, p.c., suggested to me that this picture implies a disanalogy with aesthetic experience. It isn't clear that we can exercise aesthetic discriminative abilities in response to imagination or testimony in the way we can in response to perception. That may be right, but it remains unclear how this disanalogy would bear on (MP) until its source is clarified. 43 Robert Cowan, p.c., suggested that one might think instead that if one is presented with a non-moral perception of lower level properties involved in (say) Tiananmen Square, CP will involve the activation of a cluster of beliefs and dispositions associated with peaceful criticism, injustice, and so on, which then cognitively penetrate the perceptual experience together, only once over. But I see no principled reason to think this is the only way moral perception could occur if (MP) were true. 44 I have in mind the works cited in note 1 by Greco, Watkins and Jolley, Chappell, Cullison, and McBrayer. For a yet further complication, consider the emotional and affective dispositions manifested in the sorts of overall mental states that generate the phenomenal contrast argument for (MP) are shaped by background moral beliefs. Are these emotional level perceptual content as causal relations and kind properties.
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In sum: There is a principled model of the role of perception in moral experience on which moral properties don't figure in the contents of perceptual experience. It treats the examples that are meant to make (MP) attractive as special cases of a more general and unified account of moral experience. As a simpler explanation of those cases, the model is preferable to (MP).
Two Objections
I'll now consider two objections to my argument against (MP) so far. The first objection is that the rival explanatory schema I have sketched carries some further commitments that make it no more unified or simple than (MP).
One way to press this objection is to claim that this rival explanation carries a commitment to 'cognitive phenomenology' which (MP) avoids. To acknowledge cognitive phenomenology is to acknowledge that propositional attitudes (such as believing, desiring, and hoping) constitutively involve distinctive phenomenal character or 'what-it-is-likeness'. Characterizations of CP tend to be too weak to discriminate between these rival explanations. To say that a perceptual experience E is cognitively penetrated by a background belief, desire, or other cognitive state C is to say that the phenomenal character of E depends non-trivially on C. The relevant relation of dependence looks to be some suitably internal and mental relation of causal dependence. Now suppose we understand this relation counterfactually: if C didn't occur (antecedent to E), then E wouldn't occur.
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This characterization is too weak to distinguish, at least in some cases, between the claim that C penetrates the content of the perceptual experience E and the claim that C somehow or other penetrates the overall mental state of which E is a part.
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On the rival explanatory schema, the relevant background moral beliefs, the emotional and affective dispositions they shape, and non-moral perceptual inputs can stand in suitably internal and mental (indeed, contentual) relations that satisfy the counterfactual. Norma wouldn't have the emotional and affective responses she has to cases like Cat if her non-moral perceptual inputs didn't engage her background moral beliefs.
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The first objection to my argument fails.
The second objection is that not everything about moral experience that needs explanation can be explained without positing distinctively perceptual representations of moral properties. In particular, one might claim that only (MP) can explain cases where something continues to strike the subject as bad or wrong in spite of stable background beliefs to the effect that it is neither.
One notable feature of perceptual representations is that they are highly insensitive to conflicting background beliefs. For instance, in the Müller-Lyer illusion one line is experienced as being longer than the other. Whatever other adjustments the background knowledge that the lines are really of the same length might effect in my cognitive system, it won't change my perceptual phenomenology. The same is true of certain perceptual illusions, such as the horse illusion (Figure 1) , where no sense modality carries all of the information that gets represented in the experience.
Figure 1
The horse illusion I cannot help seeing the black box as occluding the midsection of one very long horse, although I firmly believe, on the basis of all the other horse contours, that I should complete the occluded part of the picture with the front half of the horse on the left and the rear half of the horse on the right. We cannot help completing the occluded parts of objects in the simplest way possible, even if we have some conflicting firm beliefs about how we should complete them.
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If we completed this shape by forming a non-perceptual belief that the occluded shape is such and such, our completion shouldn't be insensitive to our other beliefs in the way it is.
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To defend (MP) on the grounds that moral experiences in the putative cases of moral perception are relevantly analogous to these experiences, it won't suffice to say that the subjects of these moral experiences cannot help having Chappell, op. cit. note 1, argues that at least some (moral) patterns are properties and at least some (moral) pattern recognition is perception, so there is moral perception. But the contrast he draws between perception and inference ignores various distinctions drawn in the course of my argument. Heather Logue suggests that if instantiations of some aesthetic properties are token-identical with their non-aesthetic base properties and we can visually experience the former, then we can thereby visually experience the latter; see Logue, 'Can We Visually Experience Aesthetic Properties?', this volume. Whether this generalizes to moral properties depends partly on the issue raised in note 20: can moral properties be perceived if not all of the typically complex non-moral grounds of their instantiations are perceivable? Otherwise nothing in this paper rules out the possibility of defending (MP) on the basis of some controversial metaphysics of moral properties which requires independent argument.
that O is F independently of whether one has (non-perceptual) justification for some belief B that must be justified for the belief that O is F to be justified. For instance, memory will be an epistemically dependent source of justification if it isn't a positive source of epistemic justification in its own right, but can only transmit justification from non-memorial sources of justification.
Insofar as moral perception would involve cognitive penetration of perceptual content by background moral beliefs or emotions, moral perception seems not to provide an epistemically independent source of justification.
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For it seems that insofar as one's perceptual moral experiences would be sensitive to one's background moral beliefs or emotions, any justification that moral perception could confer on moral beliefs would be mediated by the justification for the relevant background states. And CP seems to abide by the 'garbage in, garbage out' principle: if the penetrating cognitive states are themselves epistemically unjustified, then so would be the beliefs formed on the basis of the perceptual experiences which those cognitive states penetrate. So perceptual moral experience wouldn't confer justification for moral beliefs independently of whether the relevant background states are justified. But this is just to say that perceptual moral experience would be only an epistemically dependent source of justification.
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So it seems reasonable to suppose that moral perceptions would all be epistemically dependent. No doubt this claim needs a fuller defense. But if it is right, then moral perception would make no independent contribution to a plausible moral epistemology even if it did occur.
Talk of 'seeing' things to be right or wrong can still come naturally and won't normally mislead. What we have yet to see are good reasons to think that moral perception occurs in the literal sense of (MP). Recent arguments in the 58 I follow Cowan, op. cit. note 1, who argues that (MP) doesn't provide an epistemically independent source of justification. More recently a fuller argument has been developed in David Faraci, 'A Hard Look at Moral Perception', Philosophical Studies (forthcoming). Note that I'm not supposing that CP as such is epistemologically problematic; compare Siegel, op. cit. note 7, and Vance, op. cit. note 7. 59 For all I say, moral perception might not be epistemically dependent on versions of (MP) that don't appeal to CP. What a plausible model of moral perception of this kind might look like is unclear, however. Also note that the versions of (MP) which do appeal to CP require not just that the moral concepts one has cognitively penetrate perceptual content, but also that some moral beliefs do. Merely conceptual CP isn't sufficient to explain why different things tend to strike us as wrong as the relevant background moral beliefs vary, at least in subjects whose emotional and affective dispositions aren't out of whack with their background moral beliefs. This strengthens the case that moral perception won't be epistemically independent insofar as (MP) appeals to CP. 60 Thanks to audiences at University of Leeds, the Evaluative Perception conference at University of Glasgow, and the Evaluative Perception workshop at University of Cardiff for helpful discussions of this paper. Many thanks also to Robert Cowan, David Faraci, David Killoren, Heather Logue, and Preston Werner for comments on drafts of the paper.
